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Abstract—Several types of beliefs have been hypothesized to be associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), including responsibility for harm, need to control
thoughts, overestimates of threat, intolerance of uncertainty, and beliefs about the consequences of anxiety and capacity to cope. The present study compared 62 subjects with
OCD, 45 with other anxiety disorders (AD) and 34 controls, using 3 measures of OCDrelated beliefs. OCD subjects scored higher than AD and control samples on 2 general
belief measures. A closer analysis of specific belief domains indicated that OCD subjects scored higher than AD and control subjects on all 6 specific belief domains (responsibility, control, estimation of threat, tolerance of uncertainty, beliefs about the
consequences of anxiety, and the capacity to cope). Four of the 6 domains showed reasonable convergent and discriminant validity with measures of OCD symptoms compared to other psychopathology; anxiety and coping beliefs were the exceptions. In regression analyses, cognitive measures contributed significant explanatory power beyond
mood state and worry with uncertainty predicting severity of OCD symptoms above all
other belief domains. Further research on OCD-relevant belief domains in etiology,
maintenance and treatment is warranted.  1998 Elsevier Science Ltd

Cognitive factors in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) have generated
considerable interest in the recent past. A number of cognitive models link
Requests for reprints should be sent to Gail Steketee, Ph.D., School of Social Work, Boston University, 264 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215.
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dysfunctional beliefs to OCD (McFall & Wollersheim, 1979; Salkovskis, 1989;
Tallis, 1995). From these theories have developed several cognitive treatments
that attempt to modify dysfunctional beliefs in OCD (Freeston, Rhéaume, &
Ladouceur, 1996; van Oppen & Arntz, 1994). Because of the growing importance of cognitive factors for understanding and treating OCD, a closer examination of these factors is warranted.
Several belief domains have figured prominently in theorizing and/or research on OCD. Appraisal of inflated responsibility for harm is the cornerstone of Salkovskis’s (1985) cognitive theory of OCD. He proposed that normal intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses lead to disturbance when they
are particularly salient for the individual and are associated with negative automatic thoughts and discomfort about being responsible for danger or harm
to others or self. Compulsive rituals are attempts to neutralize the discomfort
and responsibility. The importance of responsibility has been demonstrated in
several studies of compulsive activities in nonclinical and clinical subjects (e.g.,
Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran, & Woody, 1995; Rhéaume, Freeston, Dugas,
Letarte, & Ladouceur, 1995). Salkovskis (1985) has generated a self-report
measure of this domain, the Responsibility Scale. However, as yet, little work
using this scale has been published.
Several theorists have suggested that beliefs about the controllability of
thoughts are important in individuals with OCD. Wegner (1989) proposed
that processes such as thought suppression and ignoring represent efforts to
control intrusive thoughts among OCD clients, but may in fact increase their
frequency. In Salkovskis’s (1989) theory, meta-cognitive beliefs about the
need for mental self-control affect appraisal of one’s thoughts and contribute
to the development of OCD. Likewise, Clark and Purdon (1993) have presented a cognitive model focusing on dysfunctional meta-cognitive beliefs
concerning the need to control thinking and a general breakdown in the ability
of obsession-prone people to control their mental activity. Few studies have
examined beliefs about control, however.
Many OCD clients are thought to overestimate the threat of negative consequences with regard to the likelihood of aversive events, as well as their severity (Carr, 1974; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Salkovskis, 1985; Steiner, 1972). Kozak,
Foa, and McCarthy (1987) suggested a reason for this bias, that people with
OCD have difficulty with epistemological reasoning related to their excessive
fear of harm, viewing obsessive situations as dangerous until proven safe. Few
empirical studies have examined the role these beliefs play in OCD. A recent
study found that people who score high on obsessive symptoms, as well as
those diagnosed with OCD, preferred to avoid taking even ordinary daily
risks, such as leaving a car unlocked very briefly or drinking out of a friend’s
cup (Steketee & Frost, 1994). However, recently Simos, Vaiopoulos, Giouzepas, and Parasehos (1995) failed to find a difference in the probability estimation of dangerous events as a function of scores on the revised Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory. Further research on the nature of this belief
in OCD is warranted.
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Researchers have noted that intolerance for uncertainty and indecision are
central cognitive features of OCD (Carr, 1974; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Kozak
et al., 1987). In addition, Beech and Liddel (1974) proposed that ritualistic behaviors are maintained not only to reduce immediate discomfort, but to partly
address the need for certainty before terminating an activity. Evidence supporting such cognitive problems derives from research showing that OCD
subjects were more cautious, took longer to categorize objects, requested information more frequently, and doubted their decisions (see Steketee, Frost,
Rhéaume, & Wilhelm, 1998, for review). Most of this research has concentrated on the symptom of uncertainty rather than on beliefs about uncertainty.
The present study focused on the latter.
Two additional cognitive areas may pertain to OCD. Beliefs about discomfort/anxiety have been hypothesized to play an important role in determining
OCD responses, in that patients with OCD may believe that anxiety is intolerable and will lead to severe consequences (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Freeston et al.,
1996). According to Salkovskis (1985), neutralization (rituals) is used to reduce discomfort, responsibility, and possible feared consequences. Almost no
data exist on the importance of attitudes or interpretations about discomfort/
anxiety. Guidano and Liotti (1983) have also suggested that OCD patients underestimate their ability to cope with threatening situations, resulting in pervasive uncertainty and discomfort. OCD patients appear to be more likely to
view rituals and avoidance as their only available coping strategy. Again, few
studies address this topic. Both of these belief domains are also likely to characterize other anxiety-disordered patients (see Foa & Kozak, 1986) and may
not differentiate OCD from other anxiety disorders.
Thus, several OCD-related beliefs have been described in the literature, although to date few studies have examined these beliefs. In the present study,
we sought to extend research on OCD beliefs by comparing these beliefs
among OCD patients, other anxiety-disordered patients, and nonclinical controls. Two general measures of OCD beliefs were studied: the Inventory of
Beliefs Related to Obsessions (IBRO; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, &
Gagnon, 1994) and a newly generated Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire (OCBQ; see measures below.). Freeston et al. (1993) developed the
IBRO as a general measure of OCD beliefs. The IBRO was related to OCD
symptoms in nonclinical populations, and differentiated OCD patients from
nonclinical controls. The OCBQ is a newly developed measure of OCD beliefs. In addition to a total score, the OCBQ contains 6 specific belief domains
hypothesized to be related to OCD. These are responsibility for harm, controllability of thoughts, overestimation of risk, need for certainty, beliefs
about discomfort/anxiety, and beliefs about one’s ability to cope. A second
measure of responsibility (R-Scale; Salkovskis, 1995) was also included. In addition to comparing the 3 groups on each of these measures, in the present paper we examined the relationship of each of these domains with OCD symptoms. In addition, measures of depression, anxiety sensitivity, and worry were
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also collected in order to assess the extent to which hypothesized OCD beliefs
were related to these mood disturbances commonly found in OCD and other
anxiety disorders.

METHODS
Sample
Clinical subjects were solicited from area mental health clinics and through
the Anxiety Disorders Association of America and the Obsessive Compulsive
Foundation newsletters. Included were patients who reported that they had
received a diagnosis of OCD or of another anxiety disorder (AD) from a mental health professional with whom they were currently in treatment for this
condition. Because we did not have the resources to conduct formal standardized diagnostic interviews, we sought to provide a check on diagnosis. To this
end we excluded OCD patients if their Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive
Scale (YBOCS) scores were less than 10 (just above the mean for normals;
Steketee, Frost, & Bogart, 1996) and Padua Inventory scores were less than 20
(the mean for normals; van Oppen et al., 1995). AD subjects were excluded if
YBOCS scores were 16 or greater (the clinical cut-off score in medication trials for OCD) and Padua scores were 30 or greater (conservative criteria based
on mean scores for other anxiety subjects; van Oppen et al., 1995). For controls, the exclusion criterion was a YBOCS score of 16 or greater; no Padua
scores were available for control subjects. Using these criteria, we excluded 8
OCD subjects, 7 AD subjects, and 3 controls. The final sample consisted of 62
OCD subjects, mean age was 41.8 years (SD 5 12.6), of whom 68% were female. The AD sample included 45 patients with a mean age of 46.4 years
(SD 5 12.7); 84% were female. Among the AD sample were 13 with panic disorder, 11 with panic/agoraphobia, 11 with generalized anxiety disorder, 7 with
social phobia, and 7 with agoraphobia alone. The control group of 34 subjects
(mean age was 30.8 years [SD 5 11.1], 84% female) included graduate student
and employee volunteers who were not seeking mental health treatment. The
two patient samples were comparable in age, but controls were significantly
younger than both clinical groups, F(2, 118) 5 14.46, p , .001. Chi-square
analysis indicated no significant differences between clinical patients in gender
balance.
Measures
Upon agreement to participate, subjects received a packet of self-report
measures that included the following instruments. To assess beliefs, we developed the Obsessive-Compulsive Belief Questionnaire (OCBQ) using items
modified from existing cognitive instruments and new ones generated by the
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first two authors. These items were designed to capture six theoretically derived cognitive domains: responsibility for harm, control of thoughts, threat
estimation, tolerance for uncertainty, beliefs about discomfort/anxiety, and
beliefs about coping. Items had a 7-point Likert-type format from “disagree
very much” to “agree very much”; higher scores reflected more OC beliefs.
The first four of these (but not anxiety and coping) were identified by the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitive Working Group (1997) as central to OCD. A
total of 129 items were piloted on a sample of 67 undergraduate college students. Items were discarded for restricted range, low item-subscale correlations and lack of relationship to the YBOCS. The revised scale contained 90
items comprising six subscales, which were logically derived based on the theoretical literature on beliefs in OCD. Two other measures of beliefs were included: the 20-item Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessions (IBRO; Freeston et al., 1993) and the 27-item Responsibility Scale (R-Scale; Salkovskis,
1985). Total scores summing across all items for the OCBQ and the IBRO
represented global measures of OCD-related beliefs. The subscales of the
OCBQ and the R-Scale represented more specific belief domains.
The severity of OCD symptoms was assessed with the 41-item version of
the Padua Inventory-Revised (Padua; van Oppen et al., 1995) and the self-report version (see Steketee et al., 1996) of the YBOCS (Goodman et al., 1989).
Control subjects did not complete the Padua due to methodological error.
Measures of other forms of psychopathology for purposes of assessing construct validity included the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss, Peterson,
Gursky, & McNally, 1986), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck,
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Internal Consistency and Scale Intercorrelations
As Table 1 shows, most of the six subscales of the OCBQ showed good to
very good internal consistency in patient samples. However, the alphas for
Tolerance for Anxiety and for the Responsibility subscale were modest. Internal consistencies for the total OCBQ (.97), IBRO (.87), and ResponsibilityScale (.93) were very good to excellent.
Subscales of the OCBQ were generally highly interrelated as evident in Table 1. Correlations ranged from .51 to .82 indicating substantial overlap in
these constructs.
Comparison Among OCD, AD, and Control Samples
Mean scores on OCD symptom and cognitive measures are given in Table
2. As expected, based on selection criteria, OCD subjects were clearly distinguishable by much higher scores on the Padua, F(1, 100) 5 103.11, p , .001,
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TABLE 1
Internal Consistency and Interscale Correlations (Pearsons) for OCBQ Subscales for
OCD, AD, and Control Subjects (N 5 141)

Responsibility
(10 items)
Control
(14 items)
Threat estimation
(18 items)
Tolerance for
uncertainty
(15 items)
Tolerance for
anxiety (11
items)
Coping

Responsibility

Control

Threat

Uncertainty

(.80)

.82

.82

(.88)

.81

.74

(.88)

.80

.78

.82

(.87)

.68
.51

.67
.53

.73
.57

.76
.60

Anxiety

Coping

(.80)
.74

(.84)

Note. Numbers in parentheses are alphas.
AD 5 Anxiety disorder; OCBQ 5 Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire; OCD 5 obsessive
compulsive disorder.

and on the YBOCS, F(2, 132) 5 96.08, p , .001, than AD subjects who were
similar to controls on the latter measure.
Using analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to compare groups on belief measures, OCD subjects scored higher than AD subjects and Controls on the
OCBQ total score and all six subscales (Fs $ 21.16, ps , .001).1 OCD subjects
also scored higher than AD and Control subjects on the IBRO and the Responsibility-Scale (Fs $ 14.41, ps , .001). When age was included as a covariate in these analyses, all differences between diagnostic groups remained significant (Fs $ 12.10, ps , .001). The content domains studied appear to have
greater relevance for OCD than for other anxiety disorders or nonanxious
controls. As evident in Table 2, in post-hoc analyses using Tukey B, AD subjects did not differ from Controls on Responsibility for Harm (from the
OCBQ subscale and R-Scale), Control of Thoughts, and Threat Estimation.
AD subjects did score higher than controls on Tolerance for Uncertainty, Tolerance for Anxiety, and Beliefs About Coping, indicating that these three areas may be more prominent in OCD, but not unique features of that disorder.

1
Significant heterogeneity of variance among the groups existed for the OCBQ total, responsibility,
control, and uncertainty subscales. Nonparametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis) revealed significant differences among the groups on these measures. Thus, these differences are not a function of heterogeneity of variance.
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TABLE 2
Group Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Symptom and
Cognitive Measures for OCD, Anxiety Disorder (AD), and
Control Subjects
Subject Scores

Measure
Symptom measures
YBOCS total
M
(SD)
Padua Inventory
M
(SD)
Cognitive Beliefs Measures
OCBQ Total
M
(SD)
Responsibility
M
(SD)
Control
M
(SD)
Threat estimation
M
(SD)
Uncertainty
M
(SD)
Anxiety
M
(SD)
Coping
M
(SD)
IBRO
M
(SD)
R-Scale
M
(SD)

OCD
(n 5 62)

AD
(n 5 45)

Control
(n 5 34)

21.17a
(6.56)

7.00b
(4.94)

6.25b
(6.34)

61.82a
(24.41)

20.02b
(14.51)

375.48a
(86.11)

288.86b
(54.54)

255.17c
(55.06)

41.69a
(11.23)

28.32b
(8.07)

28.03b
(8.37)

44.36a
(16.69)

31.16b
(10.56)

27.29b
(10.54)

80.02a
(16.95)

59.42b
(15.79)

54.48b
(13.73)

63.41a
(16.26)

49.52b
(12.83)

41.68c
(11.06)

53.98a
(10.17)

45.56b
(8.91)

32.43c
(10.16)

18.58a
(6.16)

15.33b
(6.02)

10.03c
(4.89)

66.55a
(15.19)

55.30b
(13.20)

51.71b
(12.41)

81.52a
(17.30)

58.57b
(15.91)

64.17b
(15.25)

Superscripts a, b, and c in the above table indicate significant differences
between samples: a . b and b . c at p , .05.
IBRO 5 Inventory of Beliefs; OCBQ 5 Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs
Scale; R-Scale 5 Responsibility Scale; YBOCS 5 Yale-Brown Obsessive
Compulsive Scale.
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TABLE 3
Pearson Correlations Among Measures of Cognitive Beliefs
Cognitive Beliefs
OCBQ
Total
Responsibility
Control
Threat estimate
Uncertainty
Anxiety
Coping
IBRO

IBRO

R-Scale

0.79
0.70
0.75
0.69
0.70
0.58
0.53
—

0.74
0.73
0.69
0.69
0.71
0.58
0.44
0.59

Note. All correlations are significant at p , .001. Numbers range from
119 to 134 OCD, AD, and Controls combined.
IBRO 5 Inventory of Beliefs; OCBQ 5 Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs
Scale; R-Scale 5 Responsibility Scale.

Correlation and Regression Analyses
Table 3 shows the correlations among OCD beliefs measures; p values are
significant even with Bonferroni corrections for the number of correlations
(p , .0008). The two global measures (IBRO and OCBQ total) were highly
correlated (r 5 0.79, p , .0001) indicating strong convergent validity. The Responsibility-Scale was also strongly correlated with the OCBQ responsibility
subscale (r 5 0.74, p , .0001). There was, however, considerable overlap
among the subscales with correlations ranging from .51 to .82, indicating that
these domains may be difficult to differentiate.
Table 4 shows the correlations of OCD beliefs measures with measures of
OCD symptoms and with depression, anxiety sensitivity, and worry. All correlations were again significant using the Bonferroni correction (p , .0008). The
OCBQ total, IBRO, OCBQ subscales, and the Responsibility Scale were correlated at least moderately with the YBOCS (rs 5 0.40–0.65) and strongly
with the Padua (rs 5 0.54–0.73) supporting their association with OCD.
We tested differences between these correlations using t-tests for dependent correlations with the two clinical samples only, since controls did not
complete the Padua. For the OCBQ total score and responsibility and threat
subscales, correlations with the Padua were significantly higher than correlations with any of the three psychopathology measures, ts(97) $ 2.48, ps , .01.
For uncertainty, correlations with the Padua were significantly higher than
with depression and anxiety sensitivity (p , .05) and for anxiety, Padua correlations were higher than with anxiety sensitivity and worry (ps , .01). Only
the control and coping subscales failed to show a stronger association with the
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TABLE 4
Pearson Correlations of Measures of Beliefs with Measures of
OCD Symptoms and Other Psychopathology (N 5 136)
OCD Symptoms

OCBQ total
Responsibility
Control
Threat estimate
Uncertainty
Anxiety
Coping
IBRO
R-Scale

Psychopathology

YBOCS

Paduaa

BDI

ASI

PSWQ

0.60
0.54
0.46
0.56
0.57
0.65
0.54
0.40
0.54

0.71
0.68
0.63
0.68
0.63
0.71
0.50
0.54
0.73

0.54
0.39
0.43
0.42
0.47
0.64
0.65
0.43
0.44

0.56
0.49
0.52
0.48
0.53
0.58
0.41
0.41
0.41

0.59
0.49
0.43
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.66
0.40
0.52

Note. All correlations significant at p , .0001.
ASI 5 Anxiety Sensitivity Index; BDI 5 Beck Depression Inventory;
IBRO 5 Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessions; OCBQ 5 ObsessiveCompulsive Beliefs Questionnaire; PSWQ 5 Penn State Worry Questionnaire; R-Scale 5 Responsibility Scale; YBOCS 5 Yale-Brown Obsessive
Compulsive Scale.
a
Controls did not complete the Padua.

Padua than with other measures. Unlike the Padua correlations, OCBQ scales
were not more strongly related to YBOCS scales than to other pathology measures.
We conducted a series of forward and stepwise regression analyses on the
combined sample to determine whether general beliefs measures explained
significant variance in OCD symptoms beyond that accounted for by measures
of other pathology. Because of missing data on the Padua, the YBOCS served
as the criterion variable. The measures of depression, anxiety sensitivity, and
worry were entered first, followed by the IBRO, and OCBQ total score in any
order (Table 5). Of these the OCBQ total score explained significant variance
beyond the measures of depression, anxiety and worry, significantly increasing
the adjusted R2 (F 5 14.75, p , .0002). These regression analyses argue that
beliefs do account for substantial additional variance in OC symptom scores
beyond mood and worry. To determine whether particular belief domains explained significant variance in OCD symptoms beyond other psychopathology, we conducted a second mixed model regression analysis on YBOCS
scores. The depression, anxiety sensitivity, and worry scores were again entered first, followed by forward entry of the 6 subscales of the OCBQ. The
Tolerance for Anxiety Subscale captured most of the variance, b 5 .61. Other
betas for BDI, ASI, and PSWQ were below .17. The adjusted R2 was .45,
F(4, 101) 5 20.63, p , .0001. Because the anxiety belief items of the OCBQ,
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TABLE 5
Regression Analyses of Measures of Beliefs and Psychopathology
Using YBOCS as the Criterion
Measures

b

Adjusted R2

a

F

df

Regression analysis with IBRO and OCBQ total score included
BDI
.23
ASI
2.13
PSWQ
.13
.26
12.64
3,98
OCBQ total
.44
.35
14.50
4,97

p

.0001
.0001

Regression analysis with subscales of the OCBQ included, excepting
Tolerance for Anxiety and Coping
BDI
.45
ASI
.08
PSWQ
.32
.25
12.84
3,102
.0001
Uncertainty
.44
.36
15.75
4,101
.0001
ASI 5 Anxiety Sensitivity Index; BDI 5 Beck Depression Inventory;
IBRO 5 Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessions; OCBQ 5 ObsessiveCompulsive Beliefs Questionnaire; PSWQ 5 Penn State Worry Questionnaire; YBOCS 5 Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale.
a
Data given is the adjusted R2 and F for the combination of variables
entered up to that point.

as well as the coping subscale, were too symptom-focused rather than belieffocused, as had been originally intended, we omitted these two scales in a subsequent regression and analysis. Results of this mixed model regression analysis are given in Table 5. Beliefs about uncertainty explained variance beyond
that of mood and worry, significantly increasing the adjusted R2, F(4, 101) 5
18.05, p , .0001. No other belief domain was accepted in the equation.

COMMENT
The present findings support the hypothesis that, on average, OCD patients hold beliefs about responsibility, control, threat estimation, tolerance of
uncertainty, concern about anxiety/discomfort, and coping that are different
from those of a nonclinical population. Furthermore, compared to other anxiety-disordered patients, OCD patients hold stronger beliefs in these domains.
These findings were evident for general measures (IBRO and total OCBQ
score), as well as for individual domains. Thus, these cognitive domains may
have more relevance to OCD than to other anxiety disorders, although this
may be less true of attitudes toward anxiety symptoms and coping capacity as
noted below. The link of some of these domains to OCD has also been reported by other investigators. Responsibility has been shown by several researchers to be elevated in OCD patients compared to normal controls (Bouvard, Harvard, Ladouceur, & Cottraux, 1997; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells,

BELIEFS IN OCD

535

1997), particularly for low risk situations (Foa, Amir, Bogart, & Molnar,
1998), and compared to other patient groups (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells,
1997). Likewise, in experimental manipulations of responsibility, decreases in
perceived responsibility were associated with decreased discomfort and urges
to check (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995). There is limited evidence from other
research that overestimation of threat characterizes OCD (Freeston et al.,
1993; Steiner, 1972; Steketee & Frost, 1994). Other domains of control and uncertainty remain unstudied in clinical OCD populations.
Belief domains were also substantially correlated with measures of other
symptoms, including depression, anxiety sensitivity, and worry. However, the
correlations between most beliefs domains and OCD symptoms were generally larger than the correlations between beliefs and non-OCD symptoms, significantly so in the case of the Padua Inventory. Exceptions were beliefs about
coping, which correlated more highly with depression and worry than OCD
symptoms and were only modestly related to other measures of beliefs. Beliefs
about anxiety were also more modestly related to other belief assessments,
but strongly correlated with OCD symptoms. In reviewing the items comprising the anxiety domain, we suspect that they may capture OC symptomfocused anxiety more than independent beliefs about the effects of anxiety,
and thus our results may be less relevant to OCD than our findings suggest. Indeed, beliefs/fears about coping capacity and ability to manage anxiety would
be expected to occur across a variety of anxiety disorders besides OCD, and
although not central for patients with OC, they may play some general role in
the development and/or maintenance of this and other anxiety disorders (see
also Foa & Kozak, 1986).
Of greater interest are beliefs about responsibility, control, risk estimation,
and uncertainty. These domains were highly intercorrelated, indicating considerable overlap, as might be expected. For example, individuals who overestimate the risk of harm may also seek greater certainty and control to manage
their fears. Those who exaggerate their own responsibility may well attempt to
overcontrol thoughts and actions that they fear could cause harm. It is interesting and surprising that only uncertainty beliefs predicted YBOCS scores
beyond mood and worry. Inaccuracies in assessment may have contributed to
overlap in cognitive domains. Subscales were all highly intercorrelated, as evident in Table 1. It is also possible that intolerance of uncertainty is central to
OCD, which has been called the “doubting disease” (Ciarrocchi, 1995).
Replication of this study with patients diagnosed with a structured interview would be useful. Future research should focus on creating assessment instruments that capture essential features of cognitive experience in OCD
without confounding beliefs with symptoms and minimizing conceptual overlap among domains. Presently, the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (1997) has identified several of the above-discussed belief domains
as central to OCD. Thus, our data are consistent with expert consensus in this
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area. Two belief measures currently being piloted by the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitive Working Group assess these and other areas. Such efforts are
likely to be useful in future research on OCD beliefs and in understanding
their role in the development and maintenance of this disorder, as well as their
influence in the treatment process.
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